New Genetics, Food & Agriculture: Scientific Discoveries - Societal Dilemmas

 

Annotated Bibliography Entry

Reference: ISNAR 2002a
Title:
A Conceptual Framework for Implementing Biosafety: Linking Policy, Capacity, and Regulation
Authors: McLean, M.A., Frederick, R.J., Traynor, P.L., Cohen, J.I. and Komen, J.
Publisher: International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), The Netherlands
Publication details:
ISNAR Briefing Paper 47, March 2002, 12p

Summary
Conceptual Framework for Biosafety Regulation
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
The five elements of the conceptual framework
         
Fig.1
Basic elements providing for implementation of biosafety regulations
Crosscutting Issues: Transparency; Public Participation; Resources;
          Table 1
Key Decision Points & Policy Options 
Conclusion
Further Information
         
Annex: ISNAR 2003 Table of Contents

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Summary

Products arising from modern biotechnology provide new opportunities to achieve sustainable productivity gains in agriculture. Concerns over their possible environmental and health implications stimulated regulatory mechanisms for food safety and environmental risk assessment. Over the past two decades, national biosafety frameworks, guidelines, and regulatory systems have often been implemented on a “piece-by-piece” basis in response to the demands or urgent needs of the moment. Ideally, a biosafety system would be developed from a comprehensive plan. However, building such a system and making it operational is complicated by the fact that there is no single best approach nor standard that reflects national environmental, cultural, political, financial, and scientific heterogeneity.  

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Conceptual framework for biosafety regulation

Given these challenges and difficulties inherent in building regulatory systems and needed capacity, the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) convened an expert consultation in July 2001. The purpose of this meeting was to develop a conceptual framework to address regulatory implementation and capacity-building needs of developing countries and Parties to the Protocol. A framework for implementing national biosafety systems emerged, which consists of the following five elements:
·   
National policies, strategies, and research agendas regarding biosafety;
·   
National inventory and evaluation;
·   
The knowledge, skills, and capacity base to develop and implement a biosafety system;
·   
Development of regulations; and
·   
Implementation of regulations.

The conceptual framework clarifies critical decision points in the development of a national biosafety system, systematically examines choices among policy options, and delineates some of the scientific and social dimensions of these options. It complements ongoing regional and global projects that facilitate the development of national biosafety guidelines and frameworks.

The conceptual framework for biosafety implementation presented in this paper is based on a synthesis of the contributions made to an international expert consultation entitled “A Framework for Biosafety Implementation: A Tool for Capacity Building.” Background for the framework and substantial documentation can be found in the full proceedings (ISNAR, 2003).

The framework expands on the conceptual basis used for ISNAR’s national biosafety system studies in Egypt and Argentina and on concepts and lessons derived from other national, regional, and international experiences analyzed during the consultation.

The purpose of this framework is to address national needs regarding regulatory implementation and capacity building, in particular of those countries that are Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The framework is meant to complement the UNEP/GEF Global Project on the Development of National Biosafety Frameworks by providing guidance on the design and implementation of regulatory frameworks and related capacity-building initiatives. It is not intended to be a common road map for all Parties or countries to follow. Instead, the objective is to clarify critical decision points in the development of a national biosafety framework, to examine choices among policy options, and to delineate some of the scientific and social dimensions of these options. The consequences of policy choice on the efficiency and effectiveness of biosafety regulations are presented in more detail by McLean et al. (2001)1.

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The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

Adopted in January 2000 as a supplement to the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (the Protocol) addresses the safe transfer, handling, and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) that may have an adverse effect on biodiversity, taking into account risks to human health and focusing specifically on transboundary movements. The Protocol allows governments to indicate their willingness to accept imports of agricultural commodities that include LMOs by communicating their decision to the world community via the Biosafety Clearing House, a mechanism set up to facilitate the exchange of information on, and experience with, LMOs. The aim is to ensure that recipient countries have both the opportunity and the capacity to assess risks involving the products of modern biotechnology.

National, regional, and international agencies have recognized that successful implementation of the Protocol is contingent on the development of national biosafety capacity in countries that have yet to establish, or are in the process of establishing, biosafety systems. The Protocol makes clear that Parties to the Protocol must develop or have access to “the necessary capacities to act on and respond to their rights and obligations.” The Protocol provides considerable flexibility as to how importing countries may meet their obligations with respect to risk-management decision making and to the implementation of these decisions. As stated in Article 16, which deals with Risk Management, each Party has an obligation to “establish and maintain appropriate mechanisms, measures, and strategies to regulate, manage, and control risks identified in the risk assessment provisions”. 

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The five elements of the conceptual framework

The framework addresses five elements that are fundamental to the development and implementation of a national biosafety system (Figure 1).  

Figure 1. Basic elements providing for implementation of biosafety regulations


The first two elements—national policies, strategies, and research agendas regarding biotechnology and biosafety, and a national inventory and evaluation—provide the foundation for subsequent regulatory implementation. The next element—requisite knowledge, skills, and capacity base—is the resource environment within which the final two elements occur: development of regulations and implementation of regulations.

National policies and the inventory and evaluation do not lend themselves to the format used to analyze the other three elements, where decision points, policy options, and key questions were identified. National biosafety strategy is discussed conceptually, and national appraisal is addressed by broadly identifying the capacities available and needed to implement the Protocol. Three crosscutting issues, common to each element of the framework, are also identified and discussed: transparency, public participation, and resources.

Using this framework to help build more comprehensive regulatory systems gains importance as developing countries contend with increasing numbers of applications for confined field trials and commercial release. Expanding needs for assessments require careful planning to build the necessary capacity base and to clarify policy and system objectives to expedite review decisions. Otherwise, review procedures will be delayed not by the assessment, but by lack of clarity regarding policy or political matters. 

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Crosscutting issues

Crosscutting issues are the ones encountered during each stage of the development and implementation of a national biosafety system, and they are often the most challenging factors to address and resolve. These are the issues that will ultimately dictate the scope of a national policy on biosafety, and the conversion of policy into practice. Crosscutting issues affect the implementation of the system designed to assess biosafety, and perhaps more important, those nontechnical factors that are crucial to the public’s acceptance of and confidence in the decisions that are made by government on behalf of the people.

Transparency

The twin issues of public information and participation relate to the degree of transparency in a regulatory system and to the extent to which the public can provide input to the formulation either of a regulatory policy, or of specific regulatory decisions. In this context, transparency refers to the amount and level of information that governments provide on why and how certain products are regulated, on how risk assessments are performed and decisions made, and on what conclusions are reached. Transparency can also relate to the perceived independence and objectivity of the regulatory decision makers. Although closely related, public information and participation have some mutual exclusivity, as it is certainly possible to have an open and transparent process that, however, does not involve public input.

Greater transparency concerning both the risks and benefits of biotechnology products and government decision-making is an essential component of building public trust in new technologies. The dissemination of more and better information on agricultural biotechnology is a stabilizing force because, while the public may not generally read scientific studies, risk assessments, or government-decision documents, opinion leaders, members of special interest groups, or others who hope to shape public opinion, do.

Government policy on transparency will determine the extent to which the public and special interest groups will contribute to the development of a national biosafety policy; the opportunities for public participation in the risk-assessment and decision-making process; and the degree to which the public will have ready access to information about the biosafety system, the process of decision making, and the regulatory decisions that are made.


Public participation

Opportunities for public participation will necessarily reflect the political and cultural environment of a country. Countries with a history of citizen engagement in policy development are likely to include the public in the process of developing a national biosafety system, and the converse is also true. Public participation in the evolution and implementation of a national biosafety system may be the most significant factor in determining the level of public confidence in the risk assessment and management of LMOs.

Mechanisms for public participation include the following:

·        Advisory committees, particularly those tasked with evaluating the social, ethical, and economic dimensions of biosafety, where one or more members of the public should be included;

·        Public hearings or individual contributions during the development and amendment of biosafety guidelines and regulations;

·        Contributions during the risk-assessment process. This will require that the public be informed about products under review and provided with a process through which they can make submissions about the approval of an LMO.


Resources

Human, financial, and infrastructure resources largely determine the scientific and administrative capacity of any country and so obviously influence any biosafety related policy or program. Funds must be available to develop and implement a national biosafety system; to support the infrastructure required, e.g., buildings, labs, equipment, and computers; to facilitate communication and public participation; to train scientific and regulatory personnel; and to foster the research required to assure that risk assessments are sound.

Fundamental to any national biosafety system is a strong base of scientific knowledge in support of the regulatory system and the development of core competencies in biotechnology product evaluation (Table1).

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Table 1. Key Decision Points and Policy Options Related to Science and the Knowledge Base Supporting Biosafety Regulation

Decision Point

Policy Options

Key Questions

 

1.       Coordinated approaches to incorporating scientific advice into biosafety decision making

 

Development of national capacity for scientific risk assessment vs. coordinating risk assessment at a regional or subregional level

Reliance on international experts vs. domestic

 

What is the state of biotechnology development nationally: is this expected to grow, and is there an existing base of expertise which can be employed or enhanced?

Does all of the necessary expertise reside within the region, or must this be supplemented by the inclusion of external reviews and/or training?

Are there shared values and regulatory approaches among potential collaborating countries within the region?

Is there a previous history of collaboration or coordination in other regulatory arenas?
 

2.       Locating the science evaluation function within the regulatory system

 

Development of core competencies for risk assessment within government departments and agencies vs. reliance on expert advisory committees vs. a combination of both in-house and external scientific expertise.

Concentrating the risk-assessment function within a single identifiable body vs. distributing this function among different government departments and ministries

 

Does the appropriate expertise currently reside within the regulatory authority, or is it primarily within academic and other institutions?

Is there government support and commitment for the development of expertise within regulatory agencies?

Within government departments, are there adequate foresight mechanisms in place to identify potential knowledge gaps, and are there existing avenues to access training or the recruitment of “new” knowledge?

Should expert committees and advisory panels be used in all cases of product approval, or only to address specific issues of scientific uncertainty?

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Conclusion

Implementing a comprehensive, multifaceted biosafety system responsive to national regulatory needs and to various articles of the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol is a complex, resource-intensive undertaking. The conceptual framework presented here aims to clarify five interrelated elements and decision points for developing a national biosafety system, to examine choices among the various policy options, and to delineate some of the scientific and social dimensions of these options. Neither conceived as a definitive how-to guide for building a national biosafety system, nor designed to be one, the Framework is a tool for building capacity in developing countries as they develop or reevaluate their biosafety systems. Further research, case studies, and analysis are being planned to apply this framework to the individual experiences of developing countries.


Further Information

The full report of the July 2001 Biosafety Implementation meeting is contained in the ISNAR 2003 publication (McLean et al 2003). A table of contents for this report is displayed below (Annex A). 
Download ISNAR 2003 Report (490KB PDF file)

Reference:
McLean, M.A., D.J. MacKenzie, and B.A. Cole. 2001. Policy Choices in the Development of National Frameworks for Biosafety Regulation. Report for the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR), The Hague.

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Annex A. ISNAR 2003. A Framework for Biosafety Implementation: Report of a Meeting organized by ISNAR Biotechnology Service July 2001, Washington, DC, USA

Table of Contents

 

Summary 3

1. Welcome and Introduction: Consultation Objectives Joel I. Cohen 5

2. Beyond Cartagena: Collaboration in Biosafety Implementation. Patricia L. Traynor 9

3. UNEP/GEF Biosafety Enabling Pilot Project Julian Kinderlerer 11

4. The BIO-EARN Program: An African Regional Effort in Biotechnology and Biosafety Charles F. Mugoya 15

5. Biosafety Studies in Egypt and Argentina: Two Pathways to Implementation Joel I. Cohen, Patricia L. Traynor, Moises Burachik, Magdy Madkour and John Komen 21

6. Biosafety Capacity Building: A World Bank Perspective Eija Pehu 27

7. Planning for the Development of Nearly 100 National Biosafety Frameworks Christopher Briggs 31

8. Prelude to Building a Framework for Implementing Biosafety Robert J. Frederick 35

9. Working Group Synopses 39

10. What’s Next? 47

Annex 1. Consultation Agenda 49

Annex 2. List of Participants 52

Annex 3. Acronyms 55

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Web site: http://www.isnar.cgiar.org